OPSEC. Operattional Security

[JmSuttr]

https://constitution.findlaw.com/ame...otation06.html

Courts generally recognize six exceptions to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, exigent circumstances being one of them. However, as the article and case citations make clear, compliance with the Constitution is the default and expected position. Any deviation from that is subjected to the highest level of scrutiny. In fact, since numerous cases of this type have been adjudicated over the years, it's safe to say that most circumstances that are claimed to be exigent have probably already been reviewed and ruled on. Which means, unless a prosecutor is claiming a kind of exigency that already has substantial support in case law, they are likely shit out of luck.

Also (from the article), with respect to the various exceptions, digital information has been addressed:

"However, this doctrine does not allow officers to search an arrestee's digital information, such as a cell phone or computer, without a warrant. The Court found in Riley v. California that digital evidence does not pose the same threat to officer safety as a weapon. Additionally, the concern regarding the destruction of evidence is less immediate, given the seizure of electronic devices. ".

In other words, once LE has seized an electronic device, there's nothing keeping them from maintaining possession until such time as they can get a warrant. The only scenario I can think of that would change the calculus would be if there was something on the phone right now that was a legit matter of life and death. For example, let's take the current case of the celebrity's mother who's been kidnapped. If LE arrested a suspect, or person of interest, they could articulate an argument that data on the phone could point to the location of the abducted (who may be in grave danger) and therefore a warrantless search was justified. I would totally buy that argument, and I think most judges would also.

But, unless a LEO has something that rises to that level, or has already been found valid in prior cases, their argument is unlikely to withstand scrutiny.

[CuriousVaMan]

I stumbled across this site which might be of interest to some of you. It discusses Flock LPRs and provides a map of self-reported Flock locations. FYI.

https://deflock.org/

[Mike85]

The exigent circumstances doctrine can create an exception to the 4th amendment. And the circumstance they would cite seems obvious.

I'll leave the technical details of data extraction to others, but the one ironclad requirement for anything submitted to a court for consideration is that it complies with the rules of evidence. And chief among those is the requirement that evidence be lawfully acquired. LE can get some information from your phone company via subpoena. But it's safe to say that the kind of information contained on the device itself (even if backed up in the cloud) will require a search warrant. Of course, if someone gives consent then they're royally screwed!

And every piece of evidence submitted in a criminal trial requires a witness to take the stand and testify as to the provenance of that evidentiary item. The only exception to that requirement is when both prosecution and defense stipulate that neither of them intend to challenge or dispute the item. That doesn't happen often and would be highly unlikely with something as sensitive as phone data.

No paper = no evidence. That information might be usable in other ways, ethical or unethical, but not in court. And, since warrants and GJ subpoenas are used only in felony scenarios, staying on the misdemeanor side of the fence (ex. Indies) gives you maximum protection.

[Mike85]

Exigent circumstances doctrine as a fourth amendment exception.

I'll leave the technical details of data extraction to others, but the one ironclad requirement for anything submitted to a court for consideration is that it complies with the rules of evidence. And chief among those is the requirement that evidence be lawfully acquired. LE can get some information from your phone company via subpoena. But it's safe to say that the kind of information contained on the device itself (even if backed up in the cloud) will require a search warrant. Of course, if someone gives consent then they're royally screwed!

And every piece of evidence submitted in a criminal trial requires a witness to take the stand and testify as to the provenance of that evidentiary item. The only exception to that requirement is when both prosecution and defense stipulate that neither of them intend to challenge or dispute the item. That doesn't happen often and would be highly unlikely with something as sensitive as phone data.

No paper = no evidence. That information might be usable in other ways, ethical or unethical, but not in court. And, since warrants and GJ subpoenas are used only in felony scenarios, staying on the misdemeanor side of the fence (ex. Indies) gives you maximum protection.

[JmSuttr]

I'll leave the technical details of data extraction to others, but the one ironclad requirement for anything submitted to a court for consideration is that it complies with the rules of evidence. And chief among those is the requirement that evidence be lawfully acquired. LE can get some information from your phone company via subpoena. But it's safe to say that the kind of information contained on the device itself (even if backed up in the cloud) will require a search warrant. Of course, if someone gives consent then they're royally screwed!

And every piece of evidence submitted in a criminal trial requires a witness to take the stand and testify as to the provenance of that evidentiary item. The only exception to that requirement is when both prosecution and defense stipulate that neither of them intend to challenge or dispute the item. That doesn't happen often and would be highly unlikely with something as sensitive as phone data.

No paper = no evidence. That information might be usable in other ways, ethical or unethical, but not in court. And, since warrants and GJ subpoenas are used only in felony scenarios, staying on the misdemeanor side of the fence (ex. Indies) gives you maximum protection.

[Peter Johnson]

Same. My mongering shit is completely removed from my daily driver. I keep everything encrypted because I like it that way. I could toss my computer and storage in the street and not worry about it being accessed by anyone.

Well I was saying my mongering is not why I encrypt my computer, but it is certainly intertwined with the rest of my data. Spreadsheets, photos, phone #s, etc. But all encrypted, and I would be much more concerned about my general financial data on there.

[Peter Johnson]

I suggest you attend criminal trial at your local court just to see how easily LE can obtain any piece of information from your phone.

Wrong. First, there aren't any criminal trials where they are trying to get into my phone. And again:

https://www.404media.co/fbi-couldnt-...-mode-enabled/

Why do I have a feeling that you don't think N95 masks work either.

[RogerOver]

I use Veracrypt as well, for all my computers and flash drives. All encrypted.

And that doesn't directly have to do with any mongering activities, but just feels natural for me to keep my private data locked down and encrypted.

Same. My mongering shit is completely removed from my daily driver. I keep everything encrypted because I like it that way. I could toss my computer and storage in the street and not worry about it being accessed by anyone.

[RogerOver]

First link is about private cloud for virtual research, second is about "learn from this app" function vs signal. Both has nothing to do with on the device data protection.

I suggest you attend criminal trial at your local court just to see how easily LE can obtain any piece of information from your phone.

Go ahead and provide an example of what you're talking about and how LE exploits it. Any court case will do.

[CanaPunter]

https://security.apple.com/blog/pcc-security-research/

https://activistchecklist.org/signal-ai/

First link is about private cloud for virtual research, second is about "learn from this app" function vs signal. Both has nothing to do with on the device data protection.

I suggest you attend criminal trial at your local court just to see how easily LE can obtain any piece of information from your phone.

[Peter Johnson]

Yep. I gave up on bitlocker years ago, especially when they started uploading the private key to the cloud. I recommend something like veracrypt whole disk encryption.
/

I use Veracrypt as well, for all my computers and flash drives. All encrypted.

And that doesn't directly have to do with any mongering activities, but just feels natural for me to keep my private data locked down and encrypted.

[RogerOver]

Yes your private key to decrypt needs to be stored locally, on your device, as is the case with Signal. Some people used Bitlocker and backed up their keys to Microsoft cloud and then Microsoft gave those to law enforcement when asked. Such a dumb, lazy mistake.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/01/22/microsoft-gave-fbi-keys-to-unlock-bitlocker-encrypted-data/

Yep. I gave up on bitlocker years ago, especially when they started uploading the private key to the cloud. I recommend something like veracrypt whole disk encryption.

Key stored locally on the phone is pretty meaningless as both Apple and Signal can read it. In Windows Signal the key protection is even worse. You need pgp on linux for real message encryption.

This simply isn't true.

https://security.apple.com/blog/pcc-security-research/

https://activistchecklist.org/signal-ai/

[CanaPunter]

Yes your private key to decrypt needs to be stored locally, on your device, as is the case with Signal. Some people used Bitlocker and backed up their keys to Microsoft cloud and then Microsoft gave those to law enforcement when asked. Such a dumb, lazy mistake.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/01/22/microsoft-gave-fbi-keys-to-unlock-bitlocker-encrypted-data/

Key stored locally on the phone is pretty meaningless as both Apple and Signal can read it. In Windows Signal the key protection is even worse. You need pgp on linux for real message encryption.

[Peter Johnson]

I see end to end encryption is misunderstood in general public. E2 EE is only meaningful if you control your encryption keys e. G. You get encrypted message from the messaging app and decrypt it using the key that only you have access to. If your keys live in the app, then the app owner can freely read all your e2 ee messages because they they can decrypt them using your decryption key.

Yes your private key to decrypt needs to be stored locally, on your device, as is the case with Signal. Some people used Bitlocker and backed up their keys to Microsoft cloud and then Microsoft gave those to law enforcement when asked. Such a dumb, lazy mistake.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/01/22/microsoft-gave-fbi-keys-to-unlock-bitlocker-encrypted-data/

[RegularJoe1985]

...Administrative subpoenas are a bit of a strange animal. Many agencies are empowered to issue their own subpoenas with respect to matters under their jurisdiction. For example, the Dept of Labor might issue an admin subpoena for the payroll records of a business. But some agencies have developed a nasty habit of issuing them for records that rightfully require a warrant or GJ subpoena and then using coercive or deceptive tactics to obtain compliance. It's truly despicable how they're being misused. What's even worse, if a company hands over your info when they shouldn't have, or weren't required to, good luck trying to challenge that later or get any relief. On the brighter side of things, if an admin subpoena is challenged or ignored, the agency will have to go to court and convince a judge that the subpoena is justified and should be enforced.

Many agencies regularly send admin subpoena to many orgs / companies / entities including cashapp, textme. Don't ask me how I know this LOL.

Nothing is safe but it is not worth the effort to get to mongers, unless of course some other crime.

But, in end-to-end encryption messages are locked with a user-specific key on the device, that is not with device maker. The private / public key pair is on device and maker gets only the public key. That is why on iphone, one needs to have ADP for cloud backup since regular backup also backs up private key which can be accessed by agencies.